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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT, a Statutory corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent~ Case No. 
9844 
vs. 
REX H. COX and WILMIN A COX, 
his wife, Defendants-Appellant. 
PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
The defendant and appellant, Rex H. Cox, in the 
above entitled action respectfully petitions the Court 
to grant a rehearing in the above entitled cause for the 
reason and upon the grounds that in its opinion hereto-
fore rendered the Court erred in the following par-
ticulars: 
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POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING 
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE LOWER 
COURT'S ORDER UNDER RULE 60(b) (1). 
POINT TWO 
'THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING IN 
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE LOWER 
COURT'S ORDER UNDER RULE 60(b) (7). 
The undersigned attorneys for the Defendant and 
Appellant, Rex H. Cox, herein, certify that in our 
opinion there is merit to the foregoing claims and that 
the court committed errors in the particulars above 
specified. 
DAHL & SAGERS 
Everett E Dahl 
Victor G. Sagers 
Attorneys for Defendant-
and Appellant 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING 
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE LOWER 
COlTRT'S ORDER UNDER RULE 60(b) (1). 
It is not counsel's purpose to further quote exten-
sively from previous decisions of this court nor to reite-
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rate what has already been said in our original and 
reply briefs. However, the lower court definitely abused 
its discretion in not setting aside the judgment under 
Rule 60 (b) (I) of our Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and this court erred in affirming said lower court's order. 
'Ve believe the Utah General Rule of Law applic-
able to Rule 60 (b) (I) to be that the court views a 
default judgment with a careful eye but in doing so 
we acknowledge that a trial court is endowed with con-
siderable latitude of discretion in granting or denying 
a motion to set aside a judgment. However, it is an 
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a judgment 
where there is reasonable justification for the defend-
ant's failure to appear and answer and the court will 
grant relief in doubtful cases so that a party may have 
a hearing. Mayhew v. Standard Gil.~onite Company~ 14 
Utah 2d 52, 376 P 2d 951; Ney v. Harrison~ 5 Utah 
2d 217, 299 P 2nd 1114; Warren 11. Dixon Ranch Co.~ 
260 P 2nd 741; Petersen v. Crosier, 29 Utah 255, 81 P. 
860. 
This court in its decision states: 
" ... the court was not obliged to believe the 
somewhat feeble excuse he gave him for not pay-
ing attention to the summons: that he thought it 
required a judge's signature." 
This in itself may be one thing, but we submit that 
the entire pleadings and fact situation must be reviewed 
as one rather than an isolated statement. The record 
will bear out that the defendant was thoroughly con-
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fused and of course was somewhat frightened because 
of his response to questions propounded to him. In 
the instant case the defendant's home is involved, the 
defendant was definitely under the impression that no 
contract had been entered into, and rightfully so, no 
money had been paid him, negotiations had not been 
completed and had been extended over a period of ap-
proximately eighteen months, therefore, these reasons, 
coupled with other reasonable statements contained in 
the record along this line would make it very obvious 
that the defendant did not understand the effect of his 
failure to answer the complaint. It is inconceivable to 
believe that if the defendant had understood the effect 
of his failure to answer the complaint and that by his 
not answering that he would be deprived of an oppor-
tunity to present his side of the case to the court and 
to haYe the issues litigated that he would not have done 
so. 
Certainly any of the foregoing reasons would ap-
pear to be justification for the judgment to be set aside 
and one in which the interest of justice and fair play 
would be involved. 
It is an obvious abuse of discretion, and a sad 
commentary, I might add, where a decision is returned 
on the basis that the court does not like the demeanor 
of the defendant on the witness stand as was done in 
the instant case. The general rule, of course, is that the 
court should be inclined to allow justice and fair play 
and allow the defendant a full and complete opportu-
nity for a hearing on the merits of the case. 
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POINT TWO 
TI-lE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING IN 
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE LOWER 
COURT'S ORDER UNDER RULE 60(b) (7). 
The court in its decision, the subject of this Petition 
for Rehearing, states as follows: 
"In his reasons for setting the judgment aside 
the defendant has specifically set out number 
one above and evidently in an effort to qualify 
under the second category has asserted the fol-
lowing additional reasons: ( 1) the judgment 
entered was based upon a void contract for the 
reason that the same did not comply with the 
Statute of Frauds; (2) the purported contract 
was void for lack of consideration ; ( 3) the j udg-
ment is inequitable." 
The very essence of Rule 60 (b) (7) is that the judg-
ment may be set aside for any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. Certainly 
if the judgment is void on its face, or if it is inequitable, 
which of course is the very essence of an equity pro-
ceeding, then of course this in itself is sufficient to set 
aside the judgment. 
We will treat ( 1) and ( 2) referred to above to-
gether. The facts and evidence show that exhibits 1-D, 
2-D, 3-D, and 4-D were placed into evidence by mutual 
consent and were actually obtained from plaintiff's 
counsel at the time of the hearing by the lower court. 
Exhibit 1-D, dated February 20, 1961, is a carbon copy 
of a purported option to purchase in the sum of $43,-
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500.00. There is no question that this offer was rejected. 
Exhibit 2-D dated April 17, 1961, signed by the de-
fendant, is a rejection of a purported verbal offer of 
$40,000.00 and a proffer of a compromise of $42,000.00. 
This offer, signed only by the defendant, Rex H. Cox, 
was also rejected verbally by the plaintiff and negotia-
tions continued. Exhibit 3-D is an offer by this defend-
ant to sell only a portion of his property for the sum 
of $35,000.00 and said letter is dated June 6, 1962, 
some fourteen months later than Exhibit 2-D, which, 
of course, is evidence that the proposal set forth in 
Exhibit 2-D was rejected. Exhibit 4-D dated August 
3, 1962, is still another offer and, of course, it is evident 
that this was rejected inasmuch as a law suit was insti-
tuted. The foregoing is conclusive evidence that there 
was never any meeting of the minds and that no valid 
contract exists. 
The judgment must be in conformity with the 
pleadings and proof. Miller v. Johnson~ 43 Utah 468, 
134 P. 1017, -1!8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 294. The complaint 
of the plaintiff (R. 1-4) states that on April 17, 1961 
the defendants offered to sell plaintiff certain real prop-
erty located in Salt Lake Count~, but plaintiff does 
not attach any offer nor specify any amounts or terms 
in connection with said offer. The plaintiff further 
states in its complaint, above referred to, that the Board 
of Education accepted and offer on April 18, 1961, 
but does not refer to what offer or the terms, etc., and, of 
course, it is an erroneous allegation as it is Yery eYident 
by the evidence set forth in the record and as Exhibits 
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3-D and 4-D bear out. Also the Judgment By Default 
( R. 8-9) does not even specify any certain contract of 
sale or terms and we quote from the record at page 8: 
"That the said plaintiff be and it is hereby 
granted specific performance of the agreement to 
sell that certain property located in Salt Lake 
County ... " 
The above does not refer to any specific contract or any 
amount and the complaint was void of same also. The 
entry of default (I-t. 10) as well as statements and 
admissions made by counsel at the previous hearing of 
this cause, upon invitation by members of the court, 
definitely shows that no contract of any nature, kind, 
or date was produced at the time the default was taken 
nor was any contract of any kind ever reduced to judg-
ment at the time of granting said default judgment 
or any time thereafter. How in good conscience can any 
court permit such an injustice to stand and to deprive 
this defendant of his day in court and a trial of the case 
upon its merits? 
A law-making power cannot validate void judg-
ments and the same rule would apply to our court. 
In Re Christiansen .. 17 Utah 412, 53 P. 103, 41 L.R.A. 
504, 7 Am. St. Rep. 794. If the judgment is void on its 
face or is void from the record and the evidence, then 
this alone is sufficient grounds to set aside the judg-
ment as to let it stand would be highly inequitable, to 
say the least. Furthermore, the court on its own motion 
could set aside judgment if it had not properly granted 
it, as was done here. 
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The inequities alone as created by the judgment 
as it now stands is sufficient basis under which to set 
aside the judgment. The lower court has created a two-
headed monstrosity incapable of enforcement to say 
the least, so ambiguous that the parties will be back 
up before this court upon attempting to enforce the 
judgment if it is allowed to stand as such. The judg-
ment as now rendered does not clearly define the parties' 
respective interests. Since the judgment against Wil-
mina Cox has been vacated does this mean that Rex H. 
Cox now has a judgment for $42,000.00 for his interest 
in the property, $20,000.00, $5,000.00, or some other 
amount, i.e.-just what are the defendants' individual 
rights under the judgment rendered by the lower court? 
CONCLUSION 
We believe Justice 'Vade in his dissenting opinion 
sets forth the position of the defendant, Rex H. Cox, 
and we therefore quote his dissenting opinion in its 
entirety and adopt same as our conclusion. 
"I think it obviously an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to refuse to set aside this default. 
The purpose of courts is to decide questions of 
law and facts on their merit after a fair and 
i1npartial trial, and promote justice under the 
law. Decisions on procedural defects should not 
be encouraged. Here the defendants were served 
with su1nmons, they were not lawyers and ob-
Yiously did not understand that the effect of their 
failure to answer the complaint would be to de-
prive them of an opportunity to present their 
10 
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side of the case to the court and have the issues 
litigated. As I understand the facts the trial 
court did set the judgment aside as against the 
wife and she will be allowed to have a hearing 
on the merits although the property in question 
is owned as joint tenants by the husband and 
wife. To me it seems that the court in making 
this kind of a decision went a lqng way to prevent 
a trial on the merits against a layman who obvi-
ously did not appreciate the effect of his failure 
to consult a lawyer and file an answer. For the 
same issues as to the wife's interest must be 
tried, although the interests of the husband and 
wife are generally so closely connected that the 
failure to vacate the judgment as against the 
husband must seriously affect the interests of the 
wife in this property." 
The judgment of the lower court refusing to set 
aside the default judgment as to this defendant should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAHL & SAGERS 
Everett E Dahl 
Victor G. Sagers 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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